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Abstract
We examine the effect of gender on real and hypothetical contributions in a threshold public
goods experiment using heterogeneous induced-values approach. Our analysis of the
experimental data leads to several findings. First, gender differences in contributions are
found for hypothetical payments, but not for real payments. This result is obtained while
controlling for subjects' true values (induced-values) as well as socio-economic variables.
Second, females are more likely to truthfully reveal their true value than males for
hypothetical payments, but this effect is not significant for real payments. One could interpret
these results as suggesting that females are more likely to state their value through
hypothetical payments.
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In this paper, we examine the inﬂuence of gender on real and hypothetical contribu-
tions in a threshold public goods experiment using a heterogeneous induced-values
approach. Our research is motivated by several strands of the research literature.
Research in social psychology indicates that females think about moral problems in a
more socially-oriented manner than males (Gilligan, 1982). Research that examines
gender diﬀerences in public goods experiments has produced mixed results. Brown-
Kruse and Hummels (1993) ﬁnd that females contribute signiﬁcantly less than males
in a continuous public goods experiment, whereas Cadsby and Maynes (1998) ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between contributions of males and females in a threshold
public goods experiment. However, recent studies have concluded that females are
more likely to respond to context than males, or females are more likely to conform
to others than males (Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Cadsby
et al., 2006). Using ﬁrst-year undergraduate students as subjects, these studies use a
homogeneous induced-value for the individual beneﬁt of the public good and the good
is provided if contributions meet or exceed a speciﬁed threshold. We extend on this
previous work examining gender diﬀerences in a threshold public goods experiment by
employing heterogeneous induced-values and using subject who are randomly selected
from the general public as opposed to ﬁrst-year undergraduates.
In the ﬁeld, survey-based, stated preference methods have been used to measure
people’s preferences for ”real world” public goods (ex. water quality improvement,
conservation of national parks, etc.). The contingent valuation method, which is the
most widely used, asks respondents to state their willingness to pay for a particu-
lar public good in a hypothetical survey. Empirical studies often control for gender,
but they have shown mixed results. Recent studies focusing on gender diﬀerences in
contingent valuations include Dupont (2004) and Farreras et al. (2005). This survey-
based method provides no real incentive for subjects to state their true values or to lie
about their values. Meta-analysis of contingent valuation studies shows that a diver-
gence exists between real and hypothetical payments (Murphy et al., 2005). Brown
and Taylor (2000) is the only existing study that compares gender diﬀerences between
hypothetical and real treatments using a ”real world” public good: conservation of
the rainforest in Costa Rica. Their results show that gender diﬀerences exist in a
hypothetical payment setting whereas the diﬀerences do not exist in a real payment
setting. This ﬁnding is consistent with their interpretation of Gilligan (1982)’s work
that ”females pay more attention to the particular context of a problem than males.”
However, the relationship between true values and gender is not controlled in their
experiments, since they use a ”real world” public good for which subjects’ true values
are unobservable. We extend Brown and Taylor (2000) by employing a heterogeneous
induced-value experimental design, which allows us to control for true values as well
as gender.
In our experiment we employ a threshold public goods game with continuous
2contributions, both real and hypothetical, along with a money-back guarantee. This
approach is similar to work in several experimental economics papers (Rondeau et
al., 2005). Our subjects are selected from a general public adult pool that balances
gender and age. In this paper, we examine gender diﬀerences for hypothetical and
real payments as well as whether gender contributes to truth revelation of value.
Following Brown and Taylor (2000), we hypothesize that gender diﬀerences will exist
for hypothetical payments, but not for real payments.
2 Experimental Design
All experiments were conducted at the laboratory for political economy at Waseda
University in November 2006. Subjects for our experiment were 45 general public
individuals who live in Tokyo and were recruited by a pooling agency. There were 3
sessions including 15 subjects in each. Session 1 consisted of 7 males and 8 females,
session 2 consisted of 8 males and 7 females, and session 3 consisted of 9 males and
6 females. At the end of the experiment, subjects received a uniform participation
fee and an extra experimental payment ranging from 0 to 2000 Japanese yen (about
17 USD) depending on their amount that they earned in experiments. Subjects were
appointed to a computer with privacy shields and no communication was allowed
between subjects. The experimenter provided oral instructions with a front screen
and answered any questions. The Z-tree software (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade
Economic Experiments) was used in all stages.
Our experiment consists of two stages. The ﬁrst stage was a threshold public goods
experiment with continuous contribution, a money back grantee, and heterogeneous
induced-values. Before beginning the public goods game, subjects were informed of
their induced-value for the public good in tokens by a value card (3, 5, 7, 9, or 11
tokens). Following the instructions for explaining induced-values found in Vossler and
McKee (2006), subjects were told that values varied across individuals, but they were
not told the range or frequency of values. We controlled induced-values and age so
that they would be the same across males and females. Table 1 shows the descriptive
statistics.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Mean)
Variables Pooled Male Female
Induced-values (Vi) 7 6.833 7.19
Age (AGE) 34.889 34.583 35.238
Income (∗10−6 JPY, INCOME) 8.2 7.666 8.809
Ni nH o u s e h o l d(NHOUS) 2.733 2.75 2.714
N 45 24 21
Subjects in groups of 5 were initially endowed with 10 tokens and asked ”how
3many tokens are you willing to pay for the provision of the public project? Please
state your payment in integers of between 0 and 10.” If the total contributions of their
group exceed the pre-announced threshold of 25 tokens, subjects receive their values
of public good minus their payment. Failure to reach the threshold results in a refund
of all contributions. The earnings that subject i receives in round t can be calculated
by subtracting her payment (CR
it)1 from the initial token (10 tokens) and adding her
induced-value (Vi) to them. The real experiment was repeated 5 times. Following this
stage, a hypothetical version of this threshold public good experiment was conducted,
also consisting of 5 rounds. Every subject participated in all 10 rounds. At the end
of each round, subjects got to see their own payoﬀ in the round. The hypothetical
and real payments in the threshold public good experiment were identical except that
subjective language was used to describe the decision-making as Taylor et al. (2001)
did. Subjects were told to ”Please remember that the outcome of this hypothetical
stage has no eﬀect on your earnings at all. However, please put yourself in the
following situation. Suppose that you faced such a decision.” We denote the subject
i’s payment in this stage as CH
it . (Superscript H means ”hypothetical setting.”)
3R e s u l t s
Result 1: Gender diﬀerences in contributions to a public good exist for hypothetical
payments, but not for real payments.
We examine gender diﬀerences as a determinant of hypothetical and real pay-
ments. Table 2 reports estimation results from three models: real payment, hypo-
thetical payment, and real payment/hypothetical payment pooled. The models were
estimated using a censored regression framework where the dependent variables are
the average payment over 5 rounds (∈ [0,10]) for both real and hypothetical settings.2
The explanatory variables used in the pooled model include subject’s induced-value
Vi, the dummy variable REAL which is equal to 1 if the payment is stated in the
real setting, an interaction term of Vi and REAL, an interaction term of REAL and
GENDER which is equal to 1 if subject’s gender is male, which captures gender
diﬀerences in the real payments decision, an interaction term of the dummy vari-
able HYPO which is equal to 1 if the payment is stated in the hypothetical setting
and GENDER, which captures gender diﬀerences in the hypothetical payments de-
cision, age AGE,i n c o m eINCOME, the number in household NHOUS,a n dt h e
dummy variable EMPLOY which is equal to 1 if subject is employed full-time. The
explanatory variables used in the real model and the hypothetical model include
induced-values Vi, the dummy variable GENDER which is equal to 1 if subject’s
gender is male, AGE, INCOME, NHOUS,a n dEMPLOY. In the pooled model,
1CR
it is the subject i’s contribution to the public good in round t (Superscript R means ”real
setting.”).
2Each subject’s contribution is bounded by 0 from below and by 10 from above and thus we
employ the censored regression model.
4the coeﬃcient of HYPO∗ GENDER is signiﬁcant at the 10% level and has a nega-
tive sign, whereas the coeﬃcient of REAL ∗ GENDER is not signiﬁcant. Also, the
coeﬃcient of GENDER is signiﬁcant at the 10% level and has a negative sign for
hypothetical payments, but is not signiﬁcant for real payments. These results show
that gender diﬀerences exist in the hypothetical setting but we ﬁnd no statistical
evidence for gender diﬀereces in the real setting, after controlling for their true values
as well as socio-economic variables.3 This result supports the results of Brown and
Taylor (2000) and also of Cadsby and Maynes (1998). The fundamental diﬀerence
between our study and Brown and Taylor (2000) is that we control for heterogeneous
true values for the public good in our statistical analysis. The results on gender are
consistent with the ﬁndings from Brown and Taylor (2000). There are diﬀerences,
however, in the overall contribution amounts to the public good. These diﬀerences
may be attributable to the fact we are controlling for induced-values, or because we
have a within subject design. The coeﬃcient of INCOME is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level in real payments and has a negative sign, but is not signiﬁcant in hypothetical
payments. We observe the opposite tendency between gender and income eﬀects in
real and hypothetical settings.
Result 2: Females are more likely to truthfully reveal their value than males through
hypothetical payments, but the gender diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant through real pay-
ments.
We also investigate gender diﬀerences for truth revelation, understatement, and
overstatement of values through real and hypothetical payments. First, we create
the individual level index of demand revelation which captures the tendency of un-
derstatement, truth revelation, and overstatement.4 The results show that for real
payments, 77.8% of subjects understate their true value, 8.4% reveal true value, and
13.8% overstate their true value, whereas in the hypothetical setting, 68% of subjects
understate, 18.2% reveal truthfully, and 13.8% overstate their true values. Then, to
investigate gender diﬀerences in the determinants of understatement, truth revela-
tion, and overstatement under real and hypothetical settings, the censored regression
analysis is employed in which the three individual level indices of Ui, Ti,a n dOi
(∈ [0,1]) are treated as the observed dependent variable.5 The explanatory variables
3Our test power may not be large enough to detect small diﬀerences and therefore we are not
accepting the null hypothesis of no gender diﬀerences for real payment.





it =1i fCit <C S i : Understatement
dT
it =1i fCit = CSi : Truth Revelation
dO
it =1i fCit >C S i : Overstatement
(1)
Then we create an individual level index: Ui =
 
t dU
it/T for understatement, Ti for truth revelation,
and Oi for overstatement. For example, Ti shows the percentage that subject i reveals her value
truthfully. We also note that Ui + Ti + Oi =1f o ra l li.
5As the previous footnote deﬁnes, each dependent variable takes a number from 0 to 1 (0, 0.2, ...
5Table 2: Determinants of Real Payment and Hypothetical Payment
Pooled Real Hypothetical
Ests. Marginal Ests. Marginal Ests. Marginal
(S.E.) Eﬀects (S.E.) Eﬀects (S.E.) Eﬀects
Const. 3.673 3.531 2.446 2.317 3.418 3.345
(1.275)*** (1.616) (1.360)**
Vi 0.135 0.130 0.341 0.323 0.108 0.105
(0.121) (0.133)** (0.112)
REAL - 1 . 5 2 7 - 1 . 4 6 8 ----
(1.380)
REAL ∗ Vi 0 . 1 7 6 0 . 1 6 9 ----
(0.166)
REAL - 0 . 9 0 1 - 0 . 8 6 6 ----
∗GENDER (0.689)
HYPO - 1 . 1 7 9 - 1 . 1 3 3 ----
∗GENDER (0.687)*
GENDER - - -1.004 -0.952 -1.069 -1.046
(0.753) (0.634)*
AGE 0.041 0.039 0.048 0.045 0.032 0.032
(0.025) (0.037) (0.031)
INCOME -0.114 -0.109 -0.216 -0.205 -0.015 -0.014
(0.056)** (0.084)** (0.071)
NHOUS -0.197 -0.189 -0.139 -1.132 -0.254 -0.249
(0.203) (0.306) (0.258)
EMPLOY 0.264 0.254 0.200 0.189 0.302 0.296
(0.552) (0.832) (0.700)
Sigma 2.216 0.224 2.352 1.991
(0.176)*** (0.266)*** (0.222)***
N 90 45 45
LogL -192.716 -97.913 -92.612
*** means ”Signiﬁcant at the 1 % level”, ** at the 5 % level, * at the 10 % level.
include subject’s induced-value Vi, the dummy variable REAL w h i c hi se q u a lt o1i f
the payment is stated in the real setting, an interaction term of Vi and REAL,a n
interaction term of REAL and GENDER, which captures gender diﬀerences in the
real payments decision, an interaction term of the dummy variable HYPO which is
equal to 1 if the payment is stated in the hypothetical setting and GENDER,w h i c h
captures gender diﬀerences in the hypothetical payments decision, AGE, INCOME,
NHOUS,a n dEMPLOY. Pooled data is used to estimate the impact of these vari-
ables on the respective indices of understate, truthful revelation, and overstate. Table
3 presents the estimation results.
, 0.8, 1) and thus we employ the censored regression model.
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Understate Truth Revelation Overstate
Ests. Marginal Ests. Marginal Ests. Marginal
(S.E.) Eﬀects (S.E.) Eﬀects (S.E.) Eﬀects
Const. -0.680 -0.272 1.811 0.332 0.392 0.106
(0.417) (0.527)*** (0.389)
Vi 0.262 0.105 -0.225 -0.041 -0.142 -0.038
(0.054)*** (0.063)*** (0.047)***
REAL 0.852 0.341 -1.286 -0.236 0.118 0.032
(0.469)* (0.511)** (0.436)
REAL ∗ Vi -0.098 -0.039 0.131 0.024 0.020 0.005
(0.063) (0.073)* (0.059)
REAL 0.395 0.158 -0.107 -0.020 -0.347 -0.094
∗GENDER (0.226)* (0.224) (0.224)
HYPO 0.464 0.186 -0.839 -0.154 0.103 0.028
∗GENDER (0.231)** (0.275)*** (0.221)
AGE -0.017 -0.007 0.010 0.002 0.011 0.003
(0.008)** (0.008) (0.008)
INCOME 0.008 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.024 -0.006
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
NHOUS 0.041 0.016 -0.132 -0.024 -0.006 -0.002
(0.065) (0.077)* (0.063)
EMPLOY 0.087 0.035 -0.377 -0.069 0.061 0.017
(0.169) (0.179)** (0.167)
Sigma 0.570 - 0.510 - 0.547 -
(0.085)*** (0.089)*** (0.091)***
N 90 90 90
LogL -53.945 -39.31 -49.155
*** means ”Signiﬁcant at the 1 % level”, ** at the 5 % level, * at the 10 % level.
Before reporting the gender diﬀerences, we ﬁrst note that the estimates of Vi
(induced-value) are signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all models with a positive sign in
the Understate model, a negative sign in both the Truth Revelation model and the
Overstate model. This means ”over contributions at low induced-values” in Ferraro
et al. (2003) and Rondeau et al. (2005). REAL allows us to analyze whether the
truth revealing (understating, or overstating) tendency is explained by the diﬀerence
between real and hypothetical settings. The results of REAL indicate that the real
payment has a positive eﬀect on the tendency to understate, and the hypothetical
payment has a positive eﬀect on the tendency to truthfully reveal value.
Now, we report the results of gender diﬀerences in truth revelation and under-
statement, after controlling for true values as well as socio-economic variables. In
the Truth Revelation model (columns Truth Revelation in Table 2), the coeﬃcient of
7HYPO∗ GENDER is signiﬁcant at the 1% level and has a negative sign, whereas
the coeﬃcient of REAL ∗ GENDER is not signiﬁcant. This result indicates that
females are more likely to truthfully reveal their value than males in the hypothetical
treatment. In the Understate model (columns Understate in Table 2), the estimation
results about GENDER show that males are more likely to understate their true
value than females. We could interpret these results as females may be more likely
to state their values through hypothetical payment than males.
4 Concluding Remarks
We examine the eﬀect of gender on real and hypothetical contribution payments in a
threshold public goods experiment with heterogeneous induced-values. We ﬁnd no ev-
idence of hypothetical bias in both females and males.6 Our analysis of experimental
data leads to several results. First, gender matters for contributions through hypo-
thetical payments, but not for contributions through real payments, after controlling
for true values as well as socio-economic variables. Second, females are more likely to
truthfully reveal their value than males though hypothetical payments, but gender is
not signiﬁcant for truthfully revealing their value through real payments. One could
interpret these results as suggesting that females be more likely to state their value
through hypothetical payments than males. Our results support previous studies of
Brown and Taylor (2000) and Cadsby and Maynes (1998). Furthermore, like Cox
and Deck (2006), we also ﬁnd that ”gender diﬀerences are dependent on the deci-
sion context.” We believe that our results contribute to well understanding of gender
diﬀerences in economic behavior as well as additional developments of survey-based
methods.
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